Themes for Pragmatics I

Plan:
- (I)   Normative Pragmatic Metavocabularies
- (II) Expressive Power of Two-Dimensional Pragmatic Metavocabularies
- (III) Asserting as the Core Performance-Kind (Pragmatic Significance) of Discursive Practice
- (IV) (Looking) Back to Kant: Recollecting

The narrative strategy is to say:

(I) What a *pragmatic* MV is, and why it should be using *normative* concepts;

(II) Why such a pragmatic MV should be deontically two-dimensional rather than merely binary;

(III) How to understand asserting as a pragmatic significance performances can have in a Game of Giving and Asking for *Reasons* (GoGAR), and how that can and why it should be used to demarcate specifically *discursive* practices; and

(IV) how these constraints on and connections between normative statuses and reasons develop ideas already are among the crucial ideas animating Kant's philosophical revolution.

I.   Normative Pragmatic Metavocabularies

<u>Plan for Normative Pragmatic MVs</u>:

1) Recap (including LW)
2) Kripkenstein
3) Regularism/Regulism (ending in implicit social practices)
4) Social Practice response
5) Antinormativism
6) Price 1 (in his terms)
7) Pragmatic MVs as in *BSD* 1. (as a way of "dividing through by naturalism" in Price).
8) Price reconstrued in terms of pragmatic MVs

1. **Recap**:

<u>For very beginning of session</u>:
Recap the distinction **Harman** motivates between **reason*ing* practices/abilities and reason *relations*.** This week we are concerned only with the practices.
The reason relations are those of of implication or consequence and (I'll say now, though not justify until later), incompatibility or incoherence.
One issue will be why we need both of these, and just these two.
These *material* relations (pre- or non-logical) will be what is made *logically* explicit by **conditionals** and **negation**.

<u>Looking Ahead</u>:
- For what we are aiming at, next week, is understanding what the turnstile of consequence *means* in terms of a normative pragmatic MV.
- We then look at **structural properties of the two fundamental kinds of reason relations**: implication or consequence and material incompatibility or incoherence.
- Then we will see how to introduce *logical* vocabulary to make those reason relations explicit.
- Then we will see how ***truthmaker semantics*** underwrites the same reason relations.
- Then Ulf's **isomorophism** of the bilateralist normative pragmatic MV, with *its* account of reason relations, and the truthmaker representationalist semantic MV, with *its* account of reason relations.
- Then onto the **implicational semantics** that is internal and *intrinsic* to the reason relations, and how it makes sense of Ulf's isomorphism.

- So what we want out of today is an appreciation of what pragmatic MVs are (see diagram below, from *BSD*) and why they should be *normative* (meta)vocabularies.
- We want to understand *vocabularies* in general in part in terms of this kind of MV.

I am offering **a reason-centered metavocabulary for a crucial set of metavocabularies: pragmatic, logical, semantic**.
It is a meta-metavocabulary:
a metavocabulary that applies to and relates MVs of these three basic kinds.

I think of *MIE*, *BSD*, and this story to offer different meta-metavocabularies.
I hope this one is suitably informed by those two earlier ones.
But they still say what they said and permit the expression of what they can express.
They are different MMVs.

Pragmatic Metavocabularies:

- The notion of a <u>metalanguage</u> is due to **Tarski**.
- He began with the idea of what **Carnap** would later call "*syntactic* **metalanguages**," thinking of **Hilbert**'s formalism.
- He then took inspiration from **Gödel**'s completeness and incompleteness results, and added *semantic* expressive capacities.
- In *The Logical Syntax of Language*, Carnap still exclusively used syntactic MVs.
- But, impressed by Tarski, he pushed the concept of *semantic* MVs.
  These let us talk about truth and denotation.
- In the early '50s, thinking hard about Carnap, **Sellars** introduces the idea of *pragmatic* MVs.
  (For reasons that are not clear to me, and that I think blinkered his later work, he stopped using this notion by the end of the decade (1960), even though he called on "metalinguistic" expressions to do work that could *only* be done by pragmatic metalanguages.
- I talked last time about **why I use "vocabulary" instead of "language."**
  For now it is enough that I think "language" should be restricted to ADPs, *autonomous discursive practices*—langauge games one could play though one played no other.
  And *no-one* thinks syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic "metalanguages" are autonomous in this sense.

I will start by talking about "*pragmatic metavocabularies*," understanding by that **vocabularies that let us talk about what we are *doing* when we are *saying* things**. That is, vocabularies that express (in some sense) features of discursive practices as practices (or associated abilities).

Conceptually, we need here only what Sellars called "**the notorious ing/ed ambiguity**."
Pragmatic (meta)vocabularies let us talk about the 'ing' side, and semantic ones about the 'ed' side.
This is the ordinary language distinction between
saying or thinking rather than what is said or thought.
On a representationalist view (Descartes to Kant) it is represent*ings* rather than represent*eds*.

Later I will say more carefully and technically what I mean by a "pragmatic metavocabulary for a particular vocabulary."

A big issue is whether one should use *naturalistic* or *normative* pragmatic metavocabularies.
I'll talk about this a bit more when I discuss Huw Price a bit further along.
As a first approximation, it is important to Price to use an exclusively *naturalistic* vocabulary to specify the use of linguistic expressions, whereas I think both that one will have to use normative vocabulary and that there is no methodological reason not to do so.

> (There are, of course, important question about what one ought to *mean* by "naturalistic vocabulary"—the vocabulary of fundamental physics, of the special sciences, or any ordinary empirical descriptive vocabulary—but I am not going to enter into them here. We will return to this issue in the final meetings of the course.)

Digging down a bit deeper, though, my view is more nuanced than simply denying the possibility or necessity of using a naturalistic vocabulary to specify the use of linguistic expressions in general.
I think that one must *underwrite* the *applicability* of a normative pragmatic metavocabulary.
Nothing less will support an account of the *propositional* (and so, more generally, *conceptual*) contentfulness of the expressions so used.
But that requirement is compatible with one then, in a further step, offering an account of the use of *that* vocabulary—the normative vocabulary in terms of which one characterizes the pragmatics that underlies one's logic and semantics—in some sparer vocabulary.
That is what I understand Ruth Millikan as doing, for instance.

    1½.   Start discussion of normativity with reminder about the **Kant-Frege-LW** line (including repeating Cavell).

    2. Kripkenstein

    a) Kripkenstein's setting of the problem (and its deficiencies):
- Clearer statement of claim that "<u>meaning</u> is a normative concept," is in terms of conditionals (codifying inferences or implications):

- *If* one means <u>plus</u> by "+", *then* if asked "7+5=?" one *ought* (is *committed, obliged,* it would be *correct*) to answer "12."
- The meaning statement has *normative* necessary conditions, i.e. can only be true or correct itself if some normative statement, about what one ought to do, what one is obliged or committed to do, what would be correct, is true or correct.

Aside: Compare rendering the notion of <u>modal concept</u> by the truth of conditionals whose consequent involves subjunctives:

If the coin is copper, *then* it *would* melt if heated to 1085°C.

Since the truth of the claim about copper has modally rich necessary conditions, <u>copper</u> is a modal concept. [Hint: *all* "extensional" empirical concepts are modal concepts in this sense: their applicability in one world depends on what is true at *other* possible worlds. But if there are *no* empirical concepts that are *non*-modal, in the sense of their applicability depending only what is true at *one* world, then how does possible world semantics get started?]

- Kripke asks what *fact* it is about a language-user in virtue of which they mean one thing rather than another by their words.

He professes to put *no* constraints on the answer.

But in fact he requires that the fact be specified in *non-normative* vocabulary.

Appeal to the "proper" or "correct" use of the term he would see as question-begging.

Upshot:
- If normative concepts are not semantically reducible without remainder to non-normative concepts, then it seems we have a dilemma: either read norms and so meanings out of our understanding of the realm of the real (variant: intelligible), or admit a kind of Kantian dualism of fact and norm as a successor to the Cartesian dualism of body and mind.

Then Kripkenstein: what his proper argument in first bit is.

Must say why it is *correct* that we give one arithmetic answer.

Problem is going from 'is' to 'ought'.

Issue is how *actual* uses determine *correct* ones.

But past also includes the distinction between correct past and incorrect past, and not only past judgments about correctness, but current judgments about past correctness.

The gerrymandering issue is genuine, but it is handled by our applying concepts.

3. <u>Regularism vs. Regulism</u>

Pitch it as in Ch. 1 of *MIE***: regularism vs. regulism**.

Response (in (4) below):

normative pragmatic MV, with a notion of *implicit* norms, not just *explicit* ones.

a) Main fork (Scylla and Charybdis):

Regulism: The regress argument, against the idea that behind every norm implicit in practice is a norm explicit as a principle. (platonism vs. pragmatism.) Issue: interpreting, applying, following a rule is something that can be done correctly or incorrectly, i.e. is itself a norm-governed practice, which supports assessments of correctness and incorrectness. If those, too, must be a matter of principles (interpretations, *Deutungen*) then a regress results. Kant already appreciated this argument.

Regularism: The gerrymandering argument. (Disjunctivitis a special case.) Can always find a way of construing the content of the regularity so that it is exceptionless. One then can't make sense of *violating* the norm.

4. Social Practice—Implicit Norm Response:

Via media: norms implicit in social practices. LW on signposts. "Customs, uses, institutions…" (But: teleosemantics and pragmatist=selectional modal approaches). But can one fill in this idea?

Social account of institution of normative statuses by normative attitudes.
Teleosemantic alternative.
Crispin Wright's LW: individuals go right or wrong, the community just goes.
Two objections: i) community does not apply concepts, individuals do.
                   ii) community membership is itself a normative notion: it is only members of the community that are bound by or answerable to its norms.

5. Anti-normativism

Recommend here: first Hlobil, then Ginsborg (and the *Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity,* from which it is drawn).

a) Arguments against thesis that meaning is a normative concept, by Hattiangadi, Wikforss, and Glüer:
If norm is constitutive of meaning (say, <u>plus</u>) then mistakes are impossible.
For one who fails to conform to the norm just shows they means something different, follow a different norm.
It is the claim that <u>meaning</u> is not a normative concept, in the form of the claim that *if* "following a rule" meant "according with it", anyone who did *not* follow the rule would just mean something different, and hence *mistakes* would not be possible.

b) Response: One can be "bound" by a norm in the sense of *subject to assessment* according to it, even if one does not conform to the norm (i.e. makes errors or mistakes). Using an English word (e.g. "arthritis," "molybdenum") in this sense binds you by the public norms governing the proper use of those terms. The distinction of social perspective between what norm one *acknowledges* and what others *attribute*, between the context of *deliberation* and the context of *assessment*, is crucial here.

The basic response (which we can see in Ulf's paper) to the anti-normativists about meaning is to distinguish being (properly) *subject* to evaluation according to a norm or rule and acting *correctly* according to it. [Might mention in passing: this published paper is just a version of the very first term paper he ever wrote for me.]

c) This distinction comes up already in Kant, where there is the sort of rationality *constitutive* of being a rational being, which is being subject to demands for reasons, having the responsibility to be responsive to reasons, and then there is the *evaluative* question of how sensitive or responsive to reasons one in fact is (on the practical side, how often one acts heteronomously).

6. Object Naturalism vs. Subject Naturalism.

Under "Norms," on the way to our focus on *normative* pragmatic MVs, might discuss Price's subject/object naturalism, in its own terms (and in relation to LW), then "dividing through by the naturalism," which results in pragmatic MVs sometimes being where explanation stops, instead of representational semantic MVs. The latter are what set up "placement problems" (Frank Jackson). Compare: looking for various ever more metaphysically extravagant kinds of fact building up from a Tractarian picture of what facts are. Alternative: explain how normative vocabulary works, in particular in the case of normative pragmatic MVs. Need not "find" norms in the world as specified in a physical vocabulary.
But: observability-perceivability of norms. McD contra Davidson on this point.
"Hearing" meanings.

7. Pragmatic Metavocabularies Again (More Carefully):

Recall from last week: The "vocabulary vocabulary" is a post-Quinean attempt to be amphibious between "language" and "theory," ("meaning" and "belief").

a) Main point of reading this in connection with *MIE* 1 is:

a) PV-sufficiency, is a set of practices (or abilities) such that anyone who engages in those practices (exercises those abilities) is using vocabulary V_1 so as to express the meanings in question.

*Semantic pragmatism* claims there must be PV-sufficient practices for every vocabulary.

b) VP-sufficiency, is a vocabulary sufficient to express sentences such that anyone of whom those sentences is true is engaging in the practices (exercising the abilities) in question.

The aspiration to find an explicit codification of what is implicit in practice is what inspires *logical expressivism*. But there is no guarantee that we can find such a vocabulary. Q: Is it guaranteed that *there is* such a vocabulary, (i.e. that for any discursive practices there is such)? What does the existential claim *mean*?

A much more plausible claim is that there are vocabularies that are VP-*necessary*, in the sense that there is a vocabulary (no doubt, more than one) such that there is a set of sentences in it such that if one is engaging in practices sufficient to deploy V_1, then that set of sentences must be true of one.

c) The normative pragmatics claim is that, at least if V_1 is an ADP, V_2 must be a *normative* vocabulary, in the sense that normative vocabulary is VP-*necessary* for *any* practices PV-*sufficient* for any ADP.

This is a precisification of the "normativity of meaning" claim, which is put less clearly and precisely by the claim that the concept of <u>meaning</u> is a normative concept.

In connection with this diagram:

Define *pragmatic metavocabularies* this way.

8. **Price reconstrued in terms of pragmatic MVs**:

Price point minus naturalism is the connection between explaining what you are doing in using an expression (correctly) does not settle it that the terms used can be given a representational semantics, without metaphysical extravagance.

Examples: negative and conditional facts, probabilistic facts, normative facts, semantic facts, intentional facts….
 The two kinds of MV are not so tightly linked.

The view is not that intentionality is *irreducibly* normative. It is that any account of intentionality-as-sapience = discursivity must underwrite the applicability of a normative pragmatic metavocabulary. What one then says about *that* vocabulary is another matter. In particular,

a) one *might* be able to give a *non*normative pragmatic (M)MV for that normative pragmatic MV. Or
b) one might be able to give a non-normative representational *semantic* (M)MV for that normative pragmatic MV.

It is an interesting question which of these alternatives Ruth Millikan is offering.
When Price talks about "subject naturalism", he has in mind option (a).

II.   Expressive Power of Two-Dimensional Pragmatic Metavocabularies

Binary vs. Two-Dimensional (or one-sorted vs. two-sorted)
[Adopting the latter approach, as I will recommend, is deontically "going nonbinary"]

1. Begin with one-sorted, merely binary normative vocabularies.
I'm thinking of them as applying to performances, according to the norms implicit in a practice.

- Correct/Incorrect
- Appropriate/Inappropriate (cf. proprieties vs. properties)
- Right/wrong
- Good/bad
- Verified (falsified) /Not verified (falsified)
- In-bounds/Out-of-bounds (Restall-Ripley bilateralism)
- Assertible/Non-assertible

it is in connection with this sort of binary that I think of assessment as bottoming out in responding to a performance by beating with sticks or not.

2. Dewey, Sellars, and Dummett, and Kripke's Wittgenstein and others want to use **assertibility** as the key normative concept in their vocabularies.
      Because they wanted to do some of the work otherwise done by appeal to notions of *truth*—for instance, using <u>assertibility conditions</u> rather than <u>truth conditions</u>—these were often thought of as alternative *semantic* proposals.
      In fact they should be understood as recommending working in a normative *pragmatic* metavocabulary. The debate they open up is whether some important explanatory or explicative expressive work is not better done, illumination properly sought from, pragmatic metavocabularies rather than semantic ones.
      This is the issue of pragmatic MVs vs. semantics MVs that arose when we looked at Huw Price's distinction between object and subject naturalism.

The point I want to make about assertibility theories at this point is just that they appeal to just one *kind* of normative status, even though it has two valences

"Assertibility" theories (Dewey, Sellars, Dummett) are about *entitlement*. But they don't explicitly keep separate track of *commitments*. In effect, they are *normatively single-sorted*. They just use an OK/not-OK, appropriate/inappropriate division—instead of a true/false one.

The idea for a *two-sorted* account can be traced back to [be thought of as inspired by?] Kant. He has a normative theory of judging, as undertaking a certain kind of responsibility—responsibility to synthesize—which I render in terms of "commitment," and then distinguishes which of those commitments are OK, in that one can fulfill that responsibility.

The view I'll recommend keeps separate books on commitments and entitlements (or authority and responsibility).

Commitments whose entitlements are always potentially at issue. (A version of Kant's idea: commitments whose rational credentials are at issue, commitments one is obliged to have reasons for.)

3.   A pseudo-two-dimensional halfway house:
Deontic logic: permissible/obligatory (may/must).
Permissible(X) =_df. Not-Obligatory-Not(X).
Obligatory(X) =_df. Not-Permissible-Not(X).
This strategy goes wrong twice:
   a)   It squeezes out possible regions of deontic space:
For instance: perhaps what one is permitted to do is a smaller set of doings than what one is not obliged not to do.
   b)   It appeals to and relies on the logical concept of <u>negation</u> in a naïve way—and at the wrong place in the explanation.
Other orders of explanation are possible, and perhaps preferable.
(Logical expressivism will explain <u>negation</u> in terms of <u>incompatibility</u> (contradictoriness in terms of contrariety, in Aristotelian terms), and then <u>incompatibility</u> in terms of <u>commitment</u> and <u>entitlement</u>, where committed ≠ not-entitled-not and entitled ≠ not-committed-not.

Tradition has a double-sorted version in permission/obligation. But it then spoils this potential insight by defining one in terms of the other, by analogy within deontic modals of alethic modals possible/necessary. This is a *mock* two-sortedness, because each of the two is *reducible to* the other.
But that is not the principal problem. That is that we lose the space to define, for instance, *material incompatibility* where joint commitment precludes joint entitlement. Negation can then be defined as the minimal incompatibility.

In *AR* 5, I argue that to be a GoGAR, one must distinguish commitments from entitlements.
I need to argue that in order to account for the *authority* dimension of assertion—the fact that the only *point* of making assertions is their availability as *testimony*—is that there is a shared (both by assertor and by audience) standing *responsibility* to vindicate one's *entitlement* to that *commitment*.

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Where we are going:

In discussion of <u>assertion</u> we will see the signal advantages of a **two-sorted normative MV over a one-sorted** "assertibility", proper/improper one.

Connect that point to the presuppositions of GoGAR, from *AR* 5.

Advert to the possibility of explaining representational dimension appealing to it, as in *AR* 5.

Possibly in connection with that, *de re* and *de dicto* ascriptions of propositional attitudes (commitments).

And possibly in connection with *that*, deontic scorekeeping version of JTB account of knowledge as a normative status—which we'll talk about in the Asserting section (III), coming up.

One major thread should be looking **at how much expressive power we gain in a normative pragmatic metavocabulary by using a *two-sorted* normative vocabulary, instead of a *single-sorted* one.** This, I think, is one of my big discoveries. This move is central to *MIE*, and I have exploited it in a great deal of my work since.

Single-sorted is appropriate/inappropriate, or correct/incorrect.

Double-sorted is authority/responsibility or commitment/entitlement.

That allows a notion of <u>objectivity</u>, as in *AR* 6.

Appreciating BKNS, and asserting (reasons, knowledge) both require using ***irreducibly* two-sorted—two-dimensional, not merely binary—deontic metavocabulary for characterizing discursive practice, the implicitly norm-governed (in the sense of subject to normative assessment by others) use of linguistic expressions**.

We'll see that accounts that invoke *two normative statuses* instead of just one are expressively much more powerful pragmatic metavocabularies for discursive practice. The most powerful demonstration of this is the "*objectivity proofs*" in *MIE* 8. They show that in scorekeeping terms claiming that things are thus-and-so is not *pragmatically* (and so not semantically) equivalent to any claims about who is committed or entitled to what.

Might one get a similar bonanza of expressive power by moving to a *three*-sorted deontic MV? I don't know. We'd need a colorable account of what the three are.

III.   Asserting as the Core Performance-Kind (Pragmatic Significance) of Discursive Practice

Speech act theory, in Austin and Searle, failed to make sense of the principle (for me, discourse-defining) speech act: assertion. It thereby condemned itself to being essentially parochial and peripheral, dealing only with minor, parasitic speech acts. "How to do things with words" should revolve around the principle thing one does: say something. But the account of "locutionary" force is minimal and unhelpful.

Searle: "An assertion that *p* is an undertaking to the effect that *p*."

Q: What "effect" is that?

Tim Williamson says it is a claim to knowledge.

That is more substantive, and we'll see that there is something to it. But it is not quite right.

We will dig deeper.

Two general points about assertion:

a) Can (and I want to claim, should) **demarcate specifically *discursive* (linguistic) practices** as those that practically accord some performances (take or treat them as having) the pragmatic significance of *assertions*.

b) The concepts of <u>assertion</u> and of <u>reasons</u> are reciprocally sense dependent (only intelligible together) and reciprocally reference dependent (globally, each notion is only instantiated where the other is).

Language does have a **"downtown"** (contra Wittgenstein), and it consists of **making claims and defending and challenging them with reasons.**

Languages, are, at base, systems of social practices that **make it possible to *say* something**—to make something *explicit*, in a distinctive sense.

And that, I claim, is to be able to *make claims*, which have propositional contents.

I see specifically *discursive* practices as characterized by the **iron triangle of discursiveness**:

- Pragmatically, they involve *assertings*: speech acts with a distinctive pragmatic significance (which is what I claim requires a *normative* vocabulary to specify).
- Semantically, they express *propositions*—as per Kant, Frege, and Wittgenstein, the most basic form of **conceptual** content.
- Syntactically, they involve the production of *declarative sentences*.

I think the best entry to this "iron triangle" is from the pragmatic side.

Some have objected that this is "**assertionalism**": according to great a centrality and pride of place to this one speech act.

I do *not* think this will fly if some *other* speech act (e.g. imperatives, orders) are accorded that central position—as for instance, Chris Gauker does.

On the other hand, I don't have a problem with admitting that assertion might be part of a *family* of speech acts that all come as a package. (For instance, I think some speech acts must have the pragmatic significance of *challenges*. That *can* be a further significance *claimings* can have. But it need not be.

Quill Kukla and Mark Lance's *Yo and Lo* is the state of the art argument for such a position, and I regard it as a wholly friendly amendment.

Another source of resistance claims that I set the bar too high.

I am an extravagant admirer of the work of **Michael Tomasello**, the great developmental psychologist who works with human children and chimpanzees.

We got to know each other in Leipzig, and a bit later it was convenient for him to come to Pittsburgh as my guest as a Visiting Scholar in the philosophy department.

For that academic year we met for a couple of hours every week, to talk about reasons, language, and sociality. He had already read *Making It Explicit*, and I got to know his work.

He has argued, on the basis of a mass of empirical evidence, that what sets human children apart from other primates, and sets them on the road to language, is not *intelligence* but *sociality* and its associated norms.

And he thinks that by focusing on the very high end—full-blown assertional practice—I obscure the acknowledgement of norms that amount to reasons in *pre*linguistic practices.

Again, I regard this work as proposing friendly amendments that I need to leave room for.

Normativity and Assertion

1. Discuss the speech act of *assertion* in a **deontically *two-dimensional* setting**:
a) From the point of view of authority and responsibility.
b) From the point of view of commitment and entitlement.

The basic point is that to understand the interpersonal, communicational function of assertion, one must understand practitioners as keeping track of two different dimensions of normative status, commitments and entitlements to those commitments.

That is, one must not only distinguish what others are *committed* to, but among those commitments, between which they are and which they are not *entitled* to.

For asserting is *committing* oneself (to a claimable).

But it is also *authorizing* or *licensing* others, one's audience, to do something.

What? Well, to re-assert it, upon one's testimonial authority.

But if that is right, then they *need* to be licensed to do so.

The assertor is presumed to have something the audience does not, namely the *right* to assert the claimable, to make the claim.

Now there *could* be a practice in which people just passed around such transferable entitlements. Maybe they got them from an oracle. But then the oracle must have a different kind of heritable entitlement.

In the case of assertion, what one is passing on is some kind of *right* or *entitlement*, not only to pass that right or entitlement on through re-assertions, but to use it to respond to *challenges* to their entitlements, to use it in *defending* their commitments against such challenges.

In fact, the authority one inherits testimonially from others' assertions is not just the authority to re-assert. It is the authority to use the claimable as a premise in their own *justifications* of their entitlement to (commitment to) *other* claimables.

For (a): One way of thinking about the claims by which discursive commitments are expressed is in terms of the interaction of inferentially articulated *authority* and *responsibility*.

   i. In making an assertion one lends to the asserted content one's *authority*, licensing others to undertake a corresponding commitment, to use as a premise in *their* reasoning.

Thus one essential aspect of this model of discursive practice is *communication*: the interpersonal, intracontent inheritance of entitlement to commitments.

   ii. In making an assertion one also undertakes a *responsibility*, to justify the claim if appropriately challenged, and thereby to redeem one's entitlement to the commitment acknowledged by the claiming.

Thus another essential aspect of this model of discursive practice is *justification*: the intrapersonal, intercontent inheritance of entitlement to commitments.

Main point of discussion of assertion is to show the intricate involvement with inference, that is, with *reasons*.

For this, stress that the dimension of *authority* is testimonial, to entitle others to defer a *responsibility*. That responsibility is:

   a) Invoked by challenges—paradigmatically, reasons *against*, i.e. incompatible claims = those commitment to which precludes entitlement to commitment to the incompatible one, and

   b) A responsibility to redeem or vindicate entitlement, which *must* have some mode in addition to testimonial or default—on pain of triviality.

   c) That third alternative is *justificatory* responsibility, i.e. giving reasons *for* the claim.

Though I don't want to set out the system from *RLLR* 1 yet (that is for next week), I *do* want to set it up, in the sense of setting out criteria of adequacy for the bilateralist pragmatics there. This is an important story to tell, perhaps even to add in supplementing the current text of *RLLR*

   2. The **default-and-challenge** (DaC) structure of entitlement and justification shows the essential role played by *reasons* in assertional practices.

The **Agrippan trilemma** sets up the forced choice and (so) oscillation between skepticism and foundationalism.

It says that if one is entitled to a claim, if that claim is justified, it must be justified by being inferable from some *other premises*. But then we can ask how *those* claims got justified. Either:

i.   The chain of justifying premises does not end, in which case we have an *infinite regress*, or

ii.   The chain of justifying premises repeats, in which case we have a *circular* attempt at *self-justification*, or

iii.   The chain of justifying premises reaches a set of *unjustied justifiers*, claims that can *transmit* justification, but themselves just *are* justified: a *foundation* of knowledge.

How the triangle and the morass it leads to is avoided by the default-and-challenge (D-C) structure.

We distinguish justification in the sense of the activity of justify*ing* and justification in the sense of a status of being or counting as justif*ied*. The latter is the status of entitlement. To for a belief to *be* "justified" in this sense, is for the subject to be *entitled* to a *commitment*. These are both normative, deontic statuses.

The D-C structure is what one gets by acknowledging that a commitment can acquire the status of being justified, in the sense of being a commitment one is entitled to, without that status having been acquired as the result of a *process* of justify*ing*—giving *reasons*. There are other ways to acquire entitlement. A principal one is *testimonial*. That is the function of *assertion*.

Testimony as a non-evidential form of entitlement inheritance.

Default-and-challenge epistemology. (*Inter alia*, a response to skepticism.) I think of this as just making explicit a Wittgensteinian thought. $\forall\exists$, not $\exists\forall$. For every chain of justifications there is a place where it ends ("my spade is turned"), but there is not a foundational stratum such that every chain of justifications ends there.

Justifying, presenting a reason for a claimable-believable (by making an assertion oneself) is invoking an implication relation between different contents (the reasons, and what they are reasons for). It is intercontent, but intrapersonal. Testimony, as a way of inheriting entitlement to a commitment from another assertor, is interpersonal. But it is the *same* content one's commitment testimonially inherits entitlement to. It is interpersonal and intracontent. Inheritance of entitlement to commitments, by

a) **Intracontent, interpersonal**, inference-and-assertion license: testimonial inheritance of entitlement).

b) **Intercontent, intrapersonal** inheritance (vindication) of entitlement by justifying implicational reason relations among contents.

So inference (reasons) and assertion are duals, along the dimensions of claim*able* contents and claim*ers*—what one can be committed and entitled to and who can be committed or entitled.

Justification as justify*ing* plays a crucial role in this D-C structure of commitment and entitlement.

Not all entitlements can be simply defaults and testimonially inherited defaults.

Challenging a claim is giving a reason *against* it. That removes the default entitlement. To vindicate and regain that entitlement, one must offer reasons *for* the challenged commitment.

We will understand reasons *for* as articulated by reason relations of *implication*, and reasons *against* as articulated by reason relations of *incompatibility*. But I'm not going to pursue that thread today. It is next week's topic.

What we *can* see is how practices of making *claims* or *assertions* and practices of *giving reasons* necessarily come together as parts of a single package. This is the *pragmatic primacy* of *reasons*. We will see that there are also kinds of primacy of reasons articulable in *logical* and *semantic* metavocabularies, not just in this pragmatic MV.

3. The Default and Challenge deontic normative structure is nontrivial **epistemology** built into the *pragmatics* of language use.

Note: The epistemological significance of understanding assertion properly, which is ultimately a matter of reasons, is evidence for the Dummettian thesis that '**philosophy of language is first philosophy.**'

Further, we can understand ***knowledge* as a distinctive *hybrid* kind of normative status**. We do so by understanding what it is to adopt the practical attitude toward someone of taking it that they know something: attributing the normative status of knowledge to them.

This is on the side of what Price calls "subject naturalism" rather than "object naturalism."

That is explaining some expression by explaining how it is *used*, in a pragmatic metavocabulary, rather than what it *represents*, in a semantic metavocabulary. In this case, knowledge-as-a-status talk is explained by saying what one must *do* in order thereby to be attributing knowledge.

I've suggested (in *MIE*) that we can think of what one must do in order to adopt this practical attitude, on the model of the traditional JTB account of knowledge.

- Corresponding to the Belief condition: One must take the candidate knower to have a doxastic, that is assertible, *commitment*. That is attribute that normative status.
- Corresponding to the Justification condition: One must take the candidate knower to be *entitled* to that commitment. That is attributing another kind of normative status (with the same content).

- Corresponding to the Truth condition: One must take it that what the candidate knower is committed and entitled to is *true*. But doing that, taking something to be true, is just believing it, committing oneself to that same claimable. Doing that is not adopting a practical attitude of *attributing* any status to the candidate knower. Rather it is adopting a practical attitude *oneself* of undertaking *commitment* to the same content one took the candidate knower to be both committed and entitled to.

The crucial difference is one of social perspective between the Truth condition and the Belief and Justification conditions—that taking the claim(able) to be *true* is undertaking, acknowledging, of adopting a commitment oneself, while taking another to have a belief and taking that belief to be justified is a matter rather of attributing a status to *another*.

Failure to understand that, and so focusing on knowledge as a *status* rather than on the *practical attitude* of taking someone to know, has led philosophers to formulate accounts of the *property* of **truth** that some claimables can *have* that are by turns extravagant, obscure, and inscrutable.

I claim that formulating things in a (normative, suitably two-sort deontic) *pragmatic* metavocabulary, rather than a (representational) *semantic* vocabulary offers the superior sort of understanding.

According to this account there is tight conceptual connection between the concept of *assertion* and the concept of <u>knowledge</u>. Assertional doings essentially and not just accidentally underwrite attributions of knowledge. But knowledge is not a state like commitment or entitlement. We see the social structure of *attributions* of knowledge, in the sense of seeing what one must *do* (specified in a pragmatic metavocabulary) in order thereby to be *taking* or *treating* someone practically *as* a successful knower. That does *not* settle how or whether a representational *semantic* metavocabulary will be able to understand the peculiar hybrid, social-perspectival character of the status of knowledge.

This intricate relation between the concepts of <u>assertion</u> and <u>knowledge</u> is a reciprocal sense-dependence. But it has an intricate fine-structure that is ignored in slogans such as "Knowledge is the goal (aim, ideal) of assertion," and "Assertions are knowledge claims."

The epistemological significance of understanding assertion properly, which is ultimately a matter of reasons, is evidence for the Dummettian thesis that 'philosophy of language is first philosophy.'

Not just two sorts of normative status, but also two sorts of normative *attitude*. They differ in social perspective.

Two social-perspective attitudes to statuses: attributing and acknowledging.

This is the basis of I-thou sociality, rather than I-we sociality.

Scorekeeping account of *knowledge attributions*.

Better account of relations between truth and justification than Rortyan pragmatists or assertibility theorists, or Peirceans, who take it that "true" just means "justified."

Again the "objectivity proofs" (retailed also in *AR* 6) will show that an analog of truth conditions emerges from interaction of commitment and entitlement, attribution and acknowledgement.

4. Discuss 4 sorts of reason relation, 3inference-implication relations and one incompatibility relation from two normative varieties:

i. **Commitment preserving**, corresponding for material implications to deductive implications,

ii. **Entitlement preserving**, corresponding for material implications to inductive implications, (only *prima facie*, since entitlement can always be lost by having incompatible collateral commitments).

iii. **Incompatibility**

iv. and **Incompatibility entailments**.
"Pedro is a donkey" entails "Pedro is a mammal" in the sense that everything incompatible with "Pedro is a mammal" is incompatible with "Pedro is a donkey."

Looking upstream and downstream inferentially—as in T&A.

On practices vs. abilities: The model of *playing a counter in a game*, where one need not know all the consequences one is committing oneself to or making oneself liable to (responsible for) in order to be able to make the move.

This feature is crucial to an important but under-theorized cognitive-epistemic ability that speaking a language gives us: the capacity to talk without knowing what the hell we are talking about, what we are saying, what the commitment we have undertaken *really* is. The example of *anaphora* as demonstrating this feature, since I can come late into a conversation and literally not know who I am talking about, but, by picking up and continuing an anaphoric chain, can nonetheless succeed in talking about whoever or whatever the others are talking about. This is a model for proper name usage, which is also (Kripke taught us, though not in these terms) a broadly anaphoric phenomenon. (This is also a side remark, since officially we are not looking subsententially, and sentential anaphora, prosentences such as "that is true", are a very special case, and beyond our remit here.)

Possibly:
Three global normative models for discourse;

i) *Game-theoretic semantics* (Hintikka, Erlangen school): There is an overarching imperative or goal of getting others to assent or agree with one. Normatively *compelling* assent is *winning* the game.

ii) *Co-ordination, co-operation, or consensus* is the overarching goal. (Lewis, Habermas). Lewis (*Convention*), too, is thinking game-theoretically, but about when *everyone* is better off (by their own lights) if we co-ordinate or co-operate, and hence everyone has a self-regarding reason to do so. For Habermas, I claim this is where he

sneaks in the rabbit that he then pulls out of the hat of his communicative theory of action as a foundation for liberal political theory.

iii) My third way assumes neither motivation to compel assent to one's own view, nor motivation to achieve consensus. The goal is simply *understanding* one another. This is, to be sure, a prerequisite of extracting information from the remarks of others, persuading others, and of achieving consensus. But neither goal is assumed. Re Habermas: Do not need to assume co-operativeness, or evolutionary need for co-ordination.

Describe the importance assigned to this feature by the Bremen group of political scientists (Tanya Pritzlaff). They code actual interactions in small-group committees. They were looking at competing models: speech acts aimed at persuading others of one's own view vs. speech acts aimed at arriving at consensus (on, e.g., government policy committee or corporate management committee). Could not understand what was going on. When, inspired by *MIE*, Pritzlaff had them add coding for trying to understand each others' position, they achieved a breakthrough. Well-functioning committees mostly do that.

We humans probably do have the motivations assigned by the first two models, and perhaps would not talk if we did not. But for what we are doing to be *talking*, no such assumption is required. ("vandalizing Neurath's boat")

[Do Asserting first, then show antecedents in Kant, rather than the other way around, chronologically.
Recollective stories (narratives) can be of many forms.]

1. (Looking) Back to Kant: Recollecting

Kant's normative turn.
Kant, the great, grey, mother of us all.
Normative turn: Judgings and intentional doings are things we are in a distinctive sense *responsible* for. They are exercises of our authority to undertake *commitments*.
This responsibility includes having *reasons* for them, integrating them into a *rational* synthetic unity of apperception (on cognitive side).
Judging and acting intentionally (endorsing claimables and doables) is binding ourselves by norms in the form of rules. Concepts are rules that determine what one is responsible for.
Judging is the minimal form of awareness in the sense of sapience, Kant's "apperception," because it is the minimal unit of *responsibility*.
This is reflected in Kant's understanding of the *form* of judgment:
- The *subjective form* of judgement is the "I think" that Kant says is the emptiest of all representations, because it can accompany all of them.

It stands for *who is* responsible or committed, whose authority is invested in the judgement.
- The *objective form* of judgement is the "object = x" that one is representing or judging *about*.

It stands for what one is making oneself responsible *to* in judging.
- And the concept one is applying determines what one is responsible *for* in judging.

Connecting the Kant discussion and the assertion-reasons discussion:
a) Repeat relation to BKNS as a constellation of authority and responsibility, perhaps with dignity and respect thrown in, and
b) Explain my account of the **synthetic unity of apperception** as requiring integrating the new commitment into a constellation of prior commitments according to the regulative ideal that one can be entitled to all of them. Discuss this in terms of the various rational task responsibilities: justificatory, ampliative, and critical.

Want to lay this story about *individual abilities* alongside a story about assertion as a speech act, as the *pragmatic significance* a *performance* can have in a *social practice*.

a) Kant is a crucial predecessor of this account of asserting and reasons, transposed into a normative pragmatic MV that focuses on *individual abilities* rather than a *social practices* in talking about two-dimensional normative statuses.

Dummett says "We have opposed throughout the view of asserting as the exteriorization of a prior interior act of judging. Judging, rather, is the interiorization of an exterior act of asserting."

    b)   In Kant, what I call (in *Spirit of Trust*), the Basic Kantian Normative Status (BKNS) is Having the *authority* to make oneself *responsible*—just by *taking* oneself to be responsible.
It is being *entitled* to undertake *commitments*.
This is the capacity to institute a normative *status* by adopting a normative *attitude*.

Autonomy:
The Basic Kantian Normative Status

This complex (in the sense that it is essentially two dimensional) normative status is the essence of *autonomy*.
For Kant will also think that, in an important sense, one is *only* committed to what one has committed oneself to.
(It is important that he also thinks that by *explicitly* undertaking *some* commitments, one can thereby *implicitly*—whether one realizes it or not—be undertaking others.)
Rousseau used this property to define <u>freedom</u>:
Combining
α) Rousseau's principle that "Obedience to a law one has laid down for oneself is freedom," with
β) a principle he shares with the empiricists that one is only responsible for what one has done freely and with
γ) the idea in (i) that what one *does* in the central sense of intentional agency is just what one is *responsible* for to yield an account of agency in terms of *autonomy*: freedom as the capacity (authority) to bind oneself by concepts and (so) make oneself responsible to reasons.

Kant turns that into a **criterion of demarcation** of distinctively *normative* constraints:
This constellation of ideas is the source of his criterion of demarcation of the normative, the way he distinguishes *commitments* (*normative statuses*) that determine what one *must* do in the sense of *ought* to do, from causes (*natural states*) that determine what one *must* do as a result of compulsion or coercion.

That BKNS, the authority to make oneself responsible, is our *dignity*, and is worthy of the *respect* of others, in the sense that they are *obliged* to respect it—implicitly *committed* to do so.

Next: Connect the discussion of BKNS and synthetic unity of apperception with this discussion of the pragmatics of assertional practices.

    c) The ***synthetic unity of apperception***:
Should start this story with the problem that elicited this account as a response:
This is the story of

    i.   The Port Royale and beyond account of, in effect, judging as *predicating* (something of something). This led to edifice with doctrine of concepts at the bottom, then doctrine of judgments, classifying modes of classification, and then the doctrine of syllogisms (inferences-implications) saying what are good moves, based on the kinds of classifications in the premises.

    ii.   But how does the predication model work for conditionals, or negations, or disjunctions? Or for negated conditionals or disjunctions? It does not evidently extend to complex forms of judgment—in particular, to *logically* complex forms of judgment. But, Kant thinks, being able to think, in particular, conditional and negated thoughts is essential to grasping their contents.

    iii.   He saw that the notion of <u>predication</u> or <u>classification</u> was being asked to do two jobs, that turn out to be incompatible—that is, to require different basic ideas.

- One is forming new contents from old contents.
- The other is an account of what one is *doing* in judging *that* things are thus-and-so. This was classify*ing* as a doing, which the tradition understood as an act of will, plumping for some contents and not others—endorsing them.

    The tradition was trying to use *one* notion for *both* purposes.

So Kant comes up with a new theory of judgment as endorsement.

    iv.   It appeals to the notion of <u>synthesis</u>, of a constellation of commitments that has the rational structure of a unity of apperception, an apperceptive unity. That is the unity of a constellation of judgeables that are endorsed *together*. What makes it *rational* is the kind of togetherness is aims (as a regulative ideal) to have. And that is defined in terms of what one *does* to produce and maintain that SUA: the rational task responsibilities one acknowledges and is obliged to fulfill.

    v.   This is the form of Kant's theory of judgment. What one must do, the task responsibility one undertakes in judging, is to integrate ("synthesize") one's commitment into a constellation of collateral commitments exhibiting the rational unity characteristic of apperception. That overarching rational task responsibility has three parts:

- The *justificatory* responsibility to have reasons for the commitments in one's repertoire.
- The *ampliative* responsibility to acknowledge commitment to the consequences of the commitments in one's repertoire, i.e. to those one's other commitments provide reasons for.
- The *critical* responsibility to reject and extrude commitments that are incompatible with one's other commitments, that is, that those other commitments provide decisive reasons against.

vi. Note here, probably without going into it, that the notion of <u>synthesis</u> in Kant *also* has a *sub*sentential application. This is based on Kant's patient, critical analysis of the proof-structure of Euclid's elements. He saw that existential claims, paradigmatically the proof that every line segment has a midpoint (done using circles whose centers are the endpoints) is not reconstructable syllogistically. He thought it required *doing* something, corresponding to the *constructions* in Euclid's *diagrams*. Following Hintikka, Michael Friedman has a brilliant discussion of this move in *inferentialist* terms. It is what is necessary for alternating quantifiers, $\forall\exists$ (for all line segments, there exists a midpoint). This is needed to think the idea of *infinite* magnitudes, paradigmatically, the number of points in any line segment—since subdivision into halves of line segments can be extended indefinitely.

His solution concerning what one must be able to *do* in order to think such thoughts, grasp such concepts, is equivalent to **doing quantifiers with Skolem functions**, which applied to *any* argument yield a *value* (the thing that exists). He thought of this as the *capacity* to *construct* the midpoint, and so the new half line-segment, with its midpoint, and so on.

I should say that I am mentioning this because we are in the vicinity, but that officially it doesn't matter to us since we are not going below the level of *sentences*, which this essentially does. But in this regard, Kant anticipates Frege and the modern revolution in formal logic.

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